

● PSF: Subject File: OSS. Reports. November¹⁶⁻³⁰, 1944 - ~~REDACTED~~

Box 170.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.
16 November 1944

O.S.S. Form 5-44

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file 7

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following intelligence, received by the OSS representative in Stockholm from an official Finnish source, supplements and substantially confirms the information contained in my memoranda of 30 October and 3 November, concerning Finnish uncertainty and fear of Soviet intentions:

On 22 October the Finnish Commander-in-Chief, in accordance with the armistice terms, issued an order for the demobilization of the Finnish Army, which was to be completed before 5 December 1944. The same order provided for the creation of a peace-time army equivalent to that of 1941 and to consist of 75,000 men who would serve two years. Demobilization had begun and some 75,000 men had been given furloughs home before 27 October, when the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission ordered demobilization measures to be halted. On 31 October the chairman of the Control Commission informed the Finnish Commander-in-Chief that the civic guards a rightist, paramilitary organization founded during the civil war of 1918⁷, which he characterized as sympathetic to Hitler, must be disbanded by 7 November, but that army demobilization was to be resumed beginning 8 November and concluded by 5 December. Simultaneously it was ordered that the Finnish armed forces, and

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
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By NBS Date JUN 11 1973

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all military installations including hospitals, be reduced to their size as of 1 January 1938, and organized according to the system of 1 January 1941. Under this order the Finnish armed forces will comprise three infantry divisions, four light infantry battalions, and one cavalry brigade totalling approximately 26,000 men, with an additional 11,000 men included in the air, naval, and coastal defense forces and at certain depots and other installations.



William J. Donovan
Director

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By ABJ Date JUN 11 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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16 November 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President would be interested in the attached message from our representative in Stockholm. Would you be good enough to see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

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By DBS Date JUN 11 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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16 November 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I think the President would be interested in the attached message from our Stockholm representative. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

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By WPS Date JUN 11 1973

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O.S.S. folder 5-44

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

16 November 1944

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, dated 14 November and forwarded by the OSS representative in Stockholm, forms a sequel to my memoranda of 9, 10 and 13 November concerning desertions from the "Kinfolk" Battalion and the murder of a Soviet officer in the Porkkala area:

Continuing Finnish investigations of the murder of a Soviet officer reported to have taken place on the night of 2 November during the Soviet occupation of the Porkkala area now point to the possibility that the murder was committed by a Soviet soldier over a love affair.

The OSS representative has now been informed that the "Kinfolk" Battalion, which was to have been turned over to Soviet authorities, was #4 and was composed of Ingermanlanders (Finnish inhabitants of the Leningrad area and of the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland) who came to Finland via Estonia in 1941 and 1942. Other such battalions are composed of inhabitants of Soviet East Karelia.

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Donovan
William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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17 November 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I think that the President would be interested in the attached radiotelephone message from our representative in Berne. Will you be good enough to see that it reaches him? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

17 November 1944

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I believe that you will find interesting the attached radiotelephone message from the OSS representative in Berne. This report concerns (1) the causes for the ineffectiveness of the appeals of the United States to the Austrian people to revolt and throw off the Nazi yoke, and (2) Austrian confusion regarding American policy, arising as a result of the departure of Otto from the United States.

Donovan

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 16 November 1944

#240

FROM Berne

HBC

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TO

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

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SPG 16-4008-1

AUSTRIA

Austrian friends here, as well as other well-informed observers, point out that our appeals to Austria to revolt and throw off the Nazi yoke are rather ineffective, because the Austrians to whom we appeal have no idea whatsoever as to the future which is in store for them. While they realize that, in a way, we are committed to the principle of an independent Austria as a result of the Moscow declaration, they do not know what sort of an Austria the Anglo-Saxons and the Russians have in mind, or whether it is anything which is worth fighting and dying for in response to our appeals. In fact, most of the people in Austria have the rather fatalistic feeling that it makes very little difference what they themselves do, and that their action will not influence in any way the future status of Austria. They feel that they are being asked to sacrifice their lives in a somewhat forlorn cause, and, as a result, they show very little enthusiasm for doing anything whatsoever.

The Austrians have always been a rather easy-going people, and so far, at least, we have not inspired them to shake off their natural lethargy, which has been accentuated by the years of war and privation which they have gone through. In addition, most of the able-bodied men are on the various fighting fronts. The able-bodied women are, many of them, in strange localities working in factories. Vienna has become a polyglot city, a mixture of nationalities and a Babel of tongues. Nevertheless, if the time ever comes when we can be more constructive and specific as to what fate awaits Austria when the Nazis are thrown out, we could, at least, get a larger measure of passive and, possibly, here and there some active resistance to the Nazis.

In appraising the Austrian situation, we must remember also that the Austrians have carefully observed what happened in Poland. They are inclined to feel that any uprising on their part would merely turn Vienna into a second Warsaw. Many Austrian friends point out that, in the case of other "occupied" countries, there have been governments-in-exile to serve

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PAGE 2

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

FROM Berne

TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, REF. NO. 240

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as rallying and organizing points, and that, unfortunately, Austria has nothing of this character to help cement the currents of resistance within the country.

As regards American policy, a good deal of confusion has arisen as a result of the departure of Otto from the United States. It is generally assumed, even in well-informed quarters here, that the fact that Otto was allowed to leave the United States and was apparently given priority for airplane travel implies that the United States Government favored his trip or may even be backing his pretensions. This impression has a rather unfortunate repercussion, since the elements in Austria who would be most likely to be helpful in the way of organizing resistance are largely anti-Habsburg and anti-Monarchical. Our apparent association with Otto has been the subject of much criticism, criticism which it has not been possible to obviate entirely by pointing out that the mere fact that Otto left the United States has no implication whatever or that he enjoys any political backing from the United States.

O.S.S. folder 37-44
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

17 November 1944 *file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe that you will be interested in the enclosed report prepared by an OSS representative who has just returned from China.

Donovan
William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure

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By DBA Date JUN 11 1973

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OFFICE

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OBSERVATIONS ON CHINA AS A WARTIME ALLY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No attempt is made in this brief memorandum to give a complete or in any way detailed report on the contemporary scene in China as it reflects upon the effectiveness of that country as a wartime ally of the United States. The situation is entirely too complex and too fluid to allow any one individual to do this. Rather the writer here attempts only to give his personal impressions of the limitations of present day China which have grown out of the past year's tour of duty in that country. During this period, the writer travelled widely in Free China, spent some time in the capital city of Chungking, and saw Chinese troops in action.

- - - - -

The effectivity of China as a wartime ally of the United States, except for the pinning down of Japanese troops, is decidedly limited and is steadily deteriorating. The main contributing factors seem to be as follows:

1. After seven years of war, China is "war weary".
2. Numbers of population or of soldiers do not in themselves mean effectiveness. The primary reasons why China's vast armies are so relatively ineffective are: (a) the lack of general national patriotism and the traditional Chinese attitude

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toward the soldier; (b) the low morale of the Chinese Army which grows out of a lack of national consciousness, the brutal methods of recruiting and training, and the exploitation of the common soldier by his officers; (c) the lack of adequate equipment in the hands of the Chinese fighting forces; (d) the extremely bad health conditions prevailing in the armies of China.

3. Effecting adversely both the army and the civil population is the general deterioration of the nation, economically and politically.

4. All Chinese are not of one mind as regards either the war or the peace to follow. The body politic is a mosaic of different interests and ambitions -- communists and anti-communists, nationalist and sectionalist, liberals and conservatives, pro and anti Generalissimo and Soong, patriot and opportunist, guerrillas, bandits, families divided as collaborationists and puppets in occupied China and central Government enthusiasts in Free China.

5. The debacle of the 9th War Area has then a major contributing factor to the general and growing attitude of defeatism in Free China.

6. Coupled with defeatism is the feeling that the United States, with more or less help from other allies, will defeat Japan. "We have suffered for seven years, let someone else now

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carry the burden" is a not uncommon attitude. Admiral Nimitz' promise to invade the coast of East China seems to have lowered rather than increased the Chinese desire to fight.

I.

It is not surprising that after these seven years of unequal warfare that much of China's population is war weary. This is perhaps particularly true of those vast numbers of people who are refugees in strange provinces and many of whom have been forced to evacuate several times in the face of Japanese advances. Such people number in the millions and their lot has been most pitiful. Another category is made up of peasant and coolie families who have lost their men and their animals to the army. These again number in the millions. Still another large section of the population are tired of the burdens imposed on them by the local Chinese armies and gendarmeries. Still other groups, especially in the border areas, have suffered too long and too much by living in the path of the fighting. A very limited part of the Chinese population has profited by the war. This seems more than ever to have increased and pointed up the difference between the "haves" and the "have nots". It is upon the latter group that the burdens of the war rest most heavily.

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II.

The Chinese are ardently conscious of their common racial and cultural heritage -- "folk consciousness". This, however, is quite a different thing from political homogeneity. There is not, in China, a general consciousness of "nation". Sectionalism is still rife in China and the war has done surprisingly little to reduce it. A Cantonese is still a foreigner to a Honanese and vice versa. Giving one's life for the nation of China is more or less a meaningless thing to the average Chinese soldier. Official China resents the much worn statement that "China is a geographical term and not a nation". Unfortunately this statement is nearly true. From this condition stem a number of situations which greatly reduce the effectiveness of China as a wartime ally: (a) the Chinese soldier lacks the fundamental urge to fight for his nation, and (b) the Central Government fears the loyalty of many of the best Chinese generals. A constant struggle is carried on to keep the foremost generals from becoming strong enough individually to attempt withdrawal and also to keep these same generals opposed to one another so that they will not join up in opposing the Central Government. These tactics not infrequently overshadow the effort to defeat the Japanese.

The traditional Chinese attitude toward the military has

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not too greatly changed even with this war of survival. The better Chinese do not go into the army. Results of this are inferior leadership, a strong antagonism between army and people, and a minimum average intelligence in the ranks of the army. The method of recruiting will be discussed later.

The morale of the Chinese Army is not good. Inherent contributing factors are the general lack of a national consciousness and the traditional Chinese attitude toward the soldier and warfare. The more important immediate contributing factors are to be found in the methods of recruiting and training and in the exploitation of the common soldier by his officers. Practically all recruiting is forced at the point of a gun. Coolies and peasants are seized upon the streets and country roads by groups of soldiers who must fill their quota by a given date line. If the victim cannot buy his way out he will probably get immediate preliminary indoctrination by a good beating on the spot. He may then be well bound with rope and tied in a line to others in the same position. All are then marched to the training area. Often these marches are long and made without food of any sort. Many fall by the way. In camp they are grossly underfed and live in the most appallingly unsanitary conditions. Within a few weeks these healthy and sturdy peasants and coolie boys are broken in

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health. That they persist is a marvel and that they attempt to fight at all is ^astill greater wonder. In spite of Central Government attempts to correct the practice, the old Chinese methods prevail. The food, equipment and money is the property of the officers commanding. Just enough reaches the troops to keep them at a minimum operating level. Life is everywhere cheap in China but no where else does it reach quite the same low value as in the army.

To say that the Chinese army is under-equipped is the essence of understatement. That this army still attempts to stand up to the modern Japanese army says a great deal for the individual courage of the Chinese soldier. The Chinese army is under-equipped fundamentally because adequate equipment is not available in China. Unfortunately, it is worse equipped than is necessary because all available equipment is not given to it. How much equipment is held back for future use is impossible to say, but a good deal is. This tendency seems to be increasingly important as the Central Government becomes more and more concerned with the problem of its own survival.

III.

The economic and political deterioration of China is to be seen at every hand. Evidence ranges from the steady decline of Chinese National Currency, accompanied by ever rising

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commodity prices, to the increasingly drastic and restrictive legislation of the Central Government and the persecution of the so-called liberal elements of the population. The problem of making a living becomes more and more difficult and the freedom of the individual more and more restricted. With these trends, there is a progressive loss of confidence in the government and the common soldier knows less than ever what he is fighting for.

IV.

So much has been written on the mutual opposition of the Communist groups and the Central Government that no reiteration is needed here. But these two elements are but part of the vast and complex mosaic of conflicting interest groups which go to make up the body politic of China. Equally threatening to the control of the Central Government are the war lord and secessionist governors of certain of the provinces. Yunnan, for example, is only controlled because the Central Government keeps more soldiers within the province than the governor himself can command. At this moment the Canton generals are retreating to Southeast China where it is public knowledge that they intend to set up an autonomous state -- with or without lip service to the Central Government. What is a guerrilla? Some

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By ABJ Date JUN 11 1973

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are admittedly Communist partisans. Others are renegades and bandits. Many cooperate with or fight with either the Japanese or Chinese depending upon where the greatest profit lies. Guerrillas number in the tens of millions. They do not have the same interests as the Central Government and most will not be absorbed into the Chinese state without bloody fighting at some future date. One interesting aspect of the China scene and its divided interests is seen in those many well-to-do families which maintain one generation or branch in occupied China and another in Chungking. One collaborates with the Japanese and protects the family property while the other maintains its political fences with the Central Government to protect the future. All of these trends and groups are to be found in any nation at war but in China they reach the superlative -- all of which is but another way of denying that China is a nation in the ordinary sense of the word.

V.

The defeat of the Chinese armies in the Changsha and following campaigns has had a strongly depressing influence upon the Chinese people. In part this has been "one defeat too many", but more important has been the general realization that the defeat need not have been so easy or complete. Rather

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than a united attempt to stop the Japanese advance, advantage was taken to reduce the position of certain generals and to extend the influence of the Central Government. The disillusionment resulting is perhaps best seen in the many thousands of families who, after suffering the life of refugees for upward to seven years, are at last giving up and returning to their homes in Occupied China.

VI.

Finally, and perhaps a most natural reaction, is the feeling that the Americans will win the war and so why not let them. There is no doubt that our promise to invade the coast of China, backed by our successes in the Pacific, has caused a let down in the Chinese war effort. "We have suffered and born the burden for seven years" has become a sort of official keynote. The writer on several occasions has heard Chinese complain that the American Navy has not yet arrived and so Chinese plans have been thrown out of line.

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The above points all are critical of China's effectiveness as a wartime ally of the United States. There is no desire to detract from the seven years in which an underfed and under-

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By DBJ Date JUN 11 1973

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equipped Chinese Army has managed to keep in the field in the face of one of the world's most modern fighting machines. For this we owe China a great debt. The fact remains, however, that China's strength, which was never as great as generally believed, has seriously declined. We cannot expect much of the future.

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By WBS Date JUN 11 1980

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

17 November 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see
that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

17 November 1944 *File*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT *PSF*

I believe that you will find of interest the following report from our representative in Belgrade. This report, relating to the recent conversations held in Yugoslavia between Marshal Tito and Prime Minister Subasic, both confirms and supplements the earlier reports contained in our memorandum of 3 November 1944:

"1. The recent Tito-Subasic talks were commenced on about 23 October somewhere in the Banat whither Dr. Subasic had flown from Bari. According to Dr. Subasic these preliminary conversations took place in a most friendly atmosphere, only the two principals being present, and the broad outlines of the final proposals were soon agreed to. Both of them had previously received a joint message from Messrs. Eden and Molotov expressing their hope that the conversations would result in the formation of a single unified Yugoslav Government.

"2. On 27 October, Marshal Tito came to Belgrade to place the proposals before the Anti-Fascist Council.

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On the next day, Dr. Subasic followed him here and met with the Anti-Fascist Council. Apparently, the atmosphere on this occasion was not so friendly. At all events, Dr. Subasic described it to Brig. MacLean, in confidence, as 'most difficult'. He was not permitted to be accompanied by any advisers and even his secretary was excluded. During the course of several sessions, the Marshal and Dr. Subasic reached agreement with the Council, and by 30 October the final drafting of the plan for unification of the governments was begun. This final draft was to have been ready by 31 October, but apparently some obstacles were encountered for it was not until the evening of 1 November that the work was completed. The chiefs of the British and Russian Missions were then called in to witness the initialling of the final document. During the course of the conversations, Brig. MacLean saw both Tito and Subasic frequently. Though I did not discuss the matter with Tito himself, Dr. Subasic volunteered to me some comments, stating, in particular, that Tito had proved himself most reasonable, though he had been under considerable pressure from his followers, who as Dr. Subasic expressed it, 'desired to accomplish overnight, the aims they had been dreaming of for four

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years'. ~~Though he did not say so himself~~, I gather that by 'Tito's followers' he meant the Anti-Fascist Council. There is some evidence that Dr. Subasic himself, who had not been in Serbia since the war began, was somewhat surprised at the extent of Tito's following and of their determination to break away from the past.

"3. The final agreement which was reached on 1 November is a two-and-one-half page document outlining the plan for unifying the Government. A copy thereof, as well as an English translation, were shown to me by Brig. MacLean. It acknowledges, at the outset, the right of the people of Yugoslavia to choose their own form of Government. It then states that in order to preserve the continuity of Government, both internally and in its foreign relations, the Government would continue to be a constitutional monarchy until a duly elected constituent assembly might decide otherwise. The King, however, would not return to Yugoslavia pending the results of a plebescite, but would, in agreement with Tito, appoint three regents to rule in his absence. (Both Tito and Subasic stated that it was out of the question for the King to return now as his dynasty and the court in general were held responsible by a large part of the population for the tragic events of the past three years, and that his return would only cause disorders and might well cost him his life.) It is understood that the three regents decided

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By DBS Date JUN 11 1973

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upon included a 90-year old former head of the Serbian Radical Party, a prominent Slovene, and a well-known Croat. None of them is believed to be more than a figure-head.

"4. The agreement provides for a cabinet including the six members of Dr. Subasic's Government and the twelve members of the National Committee. Twenty-eight cabinet posts are specifically listed, including a Minister of Construction, a Minister of Reconstruction and a Minister of Colonization. Whether the eighteen members of the two governments will by combining several portfolios fill all the posts, or whether other members are to be appointed from outside, is not made clear in the draft. Nor is any minister, including the premier, mentioned by name. At no time have either Tito or Subasic commented on the latter point, but I would hardly be surprised if Tito himself were elected to this post in view of his predominant position in the country.

"5. The agreement ends with a statement that the new government will publish a declaration containing the principles of the new regime. It is to be federated and democratic. The principles enumerated by the Anti-Fascist

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Council at its second session concerning equality of nationalities within the state are to be reaffirmed. No one nationality is to have preponderance over the others. Freedom of person, freedom of speech, freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom of religion are specifically to be guaranteed in the declaration. The agreement is to be signed by Subasic and Tito.

"6. The signing, however, is to take place only after King Peter has approved the plan. For this purpose Brig. MacLean was asked to go to London with a copy in order to obtain the approval of Prime Minister Churchill and the British Foreign Office. Presumably, if they approve, Peter's consent will be readily forthcoming. MacLean left by plane on 1 November, planning to return by the 4th or 5th. In the meantime, Subasic has flown to Moscow for three or four days. His purpose in so doing, as explained to MacLean, is to determine for himself Soviet intentions toward Yugoslavia. Apparently the journey is made of his own volition as he has several times asked MacLean whether he thought such a visit might be profitable. The Brigadier on each occasion has expressed the view that it might be most useful.

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"7. The question now remains whether the plan will prove acceptable to Moscow and London. Before his departure MacLean stated that he felt it was the best that could be hoped for, though he readily admitted its shortcomings which he said he would have to point out to his Prime Minister. Since he did not believe that anything Great Britain or the United States could do would result in a more satisfactory document, he was determined to try to obtain quick approval by his authorities and King Peter.

"8. The defects which MacLean had in mind are not obscure. In the first place, the Regency to be named by the King, 'in agreement' with Tito apparently will be composed of three figureheads without authority or influence. In the second place, the combined cabinet will have at least twelve of Tito's followers to six of Dr. Subasic's. It is this government that will arrange for the coming plebescite and the constituent assembly. Furthermore, Tito is today the only leader with any real power within the country. His following, whatever its relative size in proportion to the population, is the only organized, armed and active group in Yugoslavia. Thus the

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new agreement only legalizes his position as the supreme authority in the country. It is believed that he intends to utilize his authority to set up the sort of Government desired by the Anti-Fascist Council and that the plebescite will in all probability be a 'take it or leave it' proposition with no alternative but to express acceptance or rejection of the Council's platform. Under these conditions, the results are a foregone conclusion.

"9. The above considerations apply solely, so far as this report is concerned, to the manner in which Tito plans to establish a firm government under his command. What his future program is and how he plans to accomplish it, are not under discussion in this report, and it should not be assumed, necessarily, that once he is in power he intends to govern entirely without reference to the desires of the people of Yugoslavia."

Donovan
William J. Donovan
Director

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By ABJ Date JUN 11 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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17 November 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see
that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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By APL Date JUN 11 1973

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PSF: O.S. S. folder 5-44

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

file
18 November 1944

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I think that the attached radiotelephone message from our Berne representative will be of interest to you. This report deals with (1) German attitude towards Himmler, and (2) further information on conditions in Germany.

William J. Donovan

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 17 November 1944

#241

FROM BERD6

HBO

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

TO

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

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(FOR INFORMATION)

FORM 16-44000-1

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GERMANY

1. Here is a report which we have received from a reasonably good source but which I cannot definitely confirm. Opposition is brewing against Himmler. He is opposed by many of the generals of the Wehrmacht, and also by some of the SS generals of old standing who have fought in many tough battles; Generals like Sepp Dietrich. These two groups dislike to see Himmler in command of the Ersatzheer, as he never has had any military training, nor has he ever been at the front and exposed himself to the dangers of war. The influence of the Generals of the Wehrmacht with Hitler just after July 20 was temporarily at low ebb, but has again grown considerably. The above two groups of Himmler opponents are joined by a third group. This group is composed of the so-called right wing of the SS, including many members of German aristocratic families. These men know that the war is lost, and they hope to save their own skins by collaborating in liquidating the Nazi regime. They believe that the first step towards such a liquidation would be the removal of Himmler.

The same informant reports that SS Obergruppenfuhrer Hauser is to be placed in command of the so-called reduct in the Austro-Bavarian Mountain ranges. According to our friend, Hauser led a German counter-attack at Avanches in Normandy. At present he is wounded in a German hospital.

Under the leadership of Robert Ley, the Nazis are making an effort to secure for themselves the collaboration of former German Communist leaders. As a result, a number of these leaders who agreed to collaborate to a certain degree with the Nazis have recently been liberated from concentration camps, where they have been interned for many years. The organizer of this action is said to be Klaus Selzner, right-hand man of Dr. Ley.

2. Here is a further report we have received on German conditions from another source. In Berlin, the so-called Ostarbeiter, namely the civilian laborers recruited in former German-occupied Russia, are seen everywhere and have given a new appearance to the city's population.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PAGE 2

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

FROM Berne

TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

REF. NO. 241

RECEIVED

Many of them do not live any longer in barracks, but have established themselves in the ruins of bombed buildings, where the original inhabitants have been evacuated. My informant has had many talks with them and believes that a substantial number of them will remain in Germany, where they are already making plans about the stores in the neighborhood they intend to take over when the Nazi regime collapses.

A movement of the German population from the eastern parts of Germany, believed to be occupied by Russia, towards Western and Southern Germany, believed to be occupied by Great Britain and the United States, has set in. This source expressed the opinion that this movement would undoubtedly take on very large proportions when the zones of occupation were officially announced by the Allied Powers. He felt that such a mass movement as would then set in would tend to disrupt traffic in this territory, which is already over-taxed.

NOTE: In Flash #239 of November 14, the name Bruch should have been Bruce.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

18 November 1944

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Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President would be interested in the attached radiotelephone message from our Berne office. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

21 November 1944

fil
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

O.S.S. folder 37-44
PSF
The OSS representative in London has forwarded the following account of an interview between Prime Minister Churchill and King Peter. The information was received from King Peter immediately following the interview on 17 November:

Churchill, holding in his hand a copy of the proposed agreement between Tito and Subasich, commented to King Peter that the draft could have been worse and that it represented at least a partial victory because it recognized, for the time being, the constitutional Monarchy. "As you know", Churchill added, "I am against a Regency. You are not a minor, and there is no reason for establishing a Regency. I thought Subasich was statesman enough to see the inadvisability of such a step. But I believe this clause may be eliminated; the agreement is not yet final."

King Peter told Churchill that he regarded the agreement as a polite way to oust the King quietly, that signing it would practically amount to abdication, and that he was determined not to subscribe to it under any circumstances. The King added that he wished to disavow Subasich immediately for transgressing his powers and for proceeding to Moscow without first reporting to him. This comment, however, is said to have

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By DBS Date JUN 11 1973

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infuriated Churchill, who warned the King under no circumstances to take any action before Subasich has returned to London. "I have sent a personal request to Stalin", Churchill said, "not to make any decision during his interview with Subasich, but to wait until Subasich has reported to the King and until I have had an opportunity to study the agreement. You cannot violate my promise to Stalin by acting prematurely. You wait until Subasich comes back, when the three of us will sit down and thresh the whole matter out." Churchill further informed the King he had just received a letter from Stalin, dated 12 November, in which Stalin acknowledged receipt of Churchill's request not to reach a decision at his meeting with Subasich and informed Churchill that up to that date Subasich had not arrived.

Churchill reportedly added: "You know I do not trust Tito. He surreptitiously flew to Moscow to meet with Stalin before my arrival in London. He is nothing but a Communist thug, but he is in power and we must reckon with that fact. President Roosevelt, Stalin, and I have agreed that there will be a plebiscite by which the people of Yugoslavia will decide on the question of the Monarchy. Your return, therefore, will have to be postponed until the plebiscite takes place." The King replied, "What chance have I in a plebiscite when Tito is in Yugoslavia? It will be nothing but a farce." Churchill then stated that he would insure

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By DBX date APR 11 1973

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that the plebiscite would be supervised by "impartial umpires" including "British, Americans and Russians".

During the conversation, the King said, I have followed your advice, Mr. Prime Minister, since I escaped from Yugoslavia, and look where I am today." To which Churchill replied, "Would you have been better off if you had followed Mihailovich?"

Donovan

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

21 November 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President would be interested in the attached message from our office in London. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

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By ABS Date JUN 11 1973

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O.S. 5 from 5-44

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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file → 21 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The inclosed dispatch from Bern is a Boston Series Report. It relates to Japan. I think it will be of particular interest to you.

Lieutenant General Kotaro Nakamura, who is referred to in paragraph 1, was Minister of War in 1933 and is now a member of the Supreme War Council. Marshal Count Hisaichi Terauchi, referred to in the same paragraph, was formerly a member of the Supreme War Council and is now Supreme Commander of the Japanese armies in the field.

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By ABJ Date JUN 11 1973

Donovan
William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure: Copy #9 of Top Secret cable OSS-IN
26099 from Bern dated November 1944

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE **NOVEMBER 20 1944**

FROM

BERN SWITZERLAND

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

DEFERRED

IN 26099

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

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CIA

009622 JUN 11 1973

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37532-1

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#969.

Japan. Following is extract of more urgent Jap military information contained in KANOV:

1. German MA School Bangkok, November 8th: Learns from Nakamura that after rain period big English offensive expected direction Rangoon, Bangkok, Saigon, mainly by land operations with air supply. Major landings expected west Rangoon; subsidiary operations against Andaman Islands. Japs optimistic, preparing counter-measures. Marshal Terauchi's staff to be transferred soon from Manila to Saigon. In preparation, Jap military police said to have just arrested 3,000 Gaullists but don't intend interfere Indo-China's independence for the moment.

2. MA Tokio, Kretschmer, November 11th: Japs expect middle November new American landings Philippines outside Leyte, perhaps Luzon southeast of Manila. Confident as to defense possibilities. Jap landings Leyte have not yet restored balance but preparing counter-attacks. Samar situation bad for Japan.

3. Ditto, November 8th: Increased riots and sabotage in whole Philippines, especially Leyte and Samar. British commando raid near Akab (sic) interpreted as preparation later landing. First Allied air attack on Jap naval bases Seletara and refineries Nodan claimed unsuccessful. Believed to be flown from India but perhaps from southern China. While Burmese and Malayan populations safe, attitude certain Thailand sectors considered dangerous. Japs expect soon occupation Liuchow.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

PAGE 2

FROM BERN SWITZERLAND TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

REF. NO. 969

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4. Niemoller (with subsignature Kretschmer), Tokio, November 9th: Japs ask information about defense measures against V-1, as they expect possible American attacks with similar weapons. However, large defensive use of flak, aircraft or balloons as in England not feasible due shortages.

5. Grand memo, unsigned, reporting conversation with Jap Berlin Embassy Secretary Ushida, October 27th: Jap attacks 13th to 16th October only Air Force; attack 17th October by combined fleet. Japs claimed smashing victory. (Wood commented on this as example of Jap lies to Germany.)

* Also received SEGJTAR.

TOR: 11/20/44, 8:45 p.m.

Copy # 7

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By DBA

Date JUN 11 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

21 November 1944

~~TOP SECRET~~

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the President will be interested
in the attached Boston Series Report. Will you
please see that it is placed on his desk?

Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure

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By WJ

Date JUN 11 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

22 November 1944

O.S.S. folder 5-44

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file

Pst

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President would be interested in the attached report received from our representative in London. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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By WPS Date JUN 11 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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22 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following intelligence has been transmitted by the OSS representative in London, and forms a sequel to my memorandum to you of 21 November:

On 16 November, King Peter received Brigadier MacLean, who reported on the recent conference between Premier Subasich and Marshal Tito, and acknowledged his own participation in the latter stages of the conference in Belgrade. MacLean assured the King that neither Subasich nor anyone else could have obtained greater concessions from Tito. MacLean asserted that all the Yugoslav nationalities, including the Serbs, are overwhelmingly pro-Tito, and that Tito will not agree to any considerable modification of the proposed agreement. If the King does not approve the draft agreement, MacLean said, Tito will repudiate the proposal and negotiations will be broken off.

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007622
By DBJ Date JUN 11 1973

Donovan
William J. Donovan
Director

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O.S.S. folder 3-44

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

23 November 1944

file

Miss Grace Tully
White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the attached report will be of
interest to the President.

Will you please see that it reaches his
desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

Attachment

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By DBL Date MAR 8 1974

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Research and Analysis Branch

R&A No. 2654

THE DEBATE ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS 28-29 SEPTEMBER 1944

Description

This debate, the most recent of many on the subject in the House of Commons, threw light upon British attitudes towards current problems of British foreign policy.

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7 November 1944

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By JPB Date MAR 8 1974

If and when this study outlives its usefulness to you, kindly return it to:

Office of Strategic Services
Chief, Research and Analysis Branch
25th and E Streets, N.W.
Washington 25, D.C.

Copy No. 24

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S U M M A R Y

On the 28 September 1944 Mr. Churchill made one of his periodic reports to the House of Commons on the war situation. His speech was followed by a debate in the House which turned for the most part on British policy towards France, Italy, Poland, the Far East, Germany, and the post-war world. On France, the sentiment expressed was unanimously in favor of early recognition of de Gaulle; on Italy, most speakers criticized the over-liberal treatment of the Italians. The Polish issue called forth strong condemnation of Russia. On the Far East, little was said. Towards Germany, there was marked moderation in temper, as compared with the previous debate; Vansittartism was conspicuously absent. On the post-war world, sentiment was divided as to the desirability of an international authority; there was, however, marked sympathy with a Western European federation under British leadership.

In summing up the debate, Mr. Anthony Eden took occasion to emphasize the danger of re-emergence of a militant Germany. Without taking sides on the Polish issue, he expressed the hope that a satisfactory solution would be found. He indicated strong approval of the idea of a Western federation and admitted that some steps had already been taken in that direction. He was, however, careful to point out that such a federation

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should be considered within the general framework of a world organization. Above all, he emphasized the importance of agreement among the three great powers.

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THE DEBATE ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS 28-29 SEPTEMBER 1944

On the 28th of September 1944 Mr. Churchill made one of his periodic reports to the House of Commons on the war situation. He began with a description of the development of the military situation, and then proceeded to deal with various current issues in British foreign relations, notably the Russian armistice terms to Finland and Roumania, Bulgaria, Poland, Italy, and France. He warned his countrymen not to be unduly perturbed by election speeches in the United States. He repeated his assurances that Britain intended to throw her whole strength into the Far Eastern war when the German war was ended. He spoke with approval of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. He ended by insisting that the most important consideration in all post-war planning was agreement among the three great powers. 1/

It was not one of Mr. Churchill's best speeches. One commentator observed: "I asked many members, Labor and Tory, what they thought of the speech. Their answer was unanimous. They declared it to be flat and tedious, the dullest he had made since the war began." 2/

It was a very cautious speech, not one intended to provoke debate. One commentator remarked: "Here was a stern Victorian parent, giving a thoroughly incomplete account of the facts of life to his child, and ending

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with an admonition to the effect that these delicate topics must not be discussed further." 3/

On the whole the speech was very well received. The House itself was in a cautious mood and mindful of the admonitions of the Prime Minister. The debate, as more than one speaker remarked, was on a high level. Altogether, fifty-three members took some part in it, though only thirty-seven of them made formal speeches. Of these, fifteen were Conservatives; twelve, Labor; three, Liberal; four, Independent; one, Communist; one, ILP; and one, Common Wealth. All parties were represented and, roughly, in proportion to their strength in the House. Of the fifty-three participants, twenty-seven had taken part in the previous debate on foreign policy in May. Indeed, it is roughly true to say that active participants in recent foreign policy debates in the House of Commons represented about one-twelfth of the House, and approximately the same twelfth. Eleven-twelfths of the House have taken no part.

Following the Prime Minister, discussion in the House turned mainly upon the following topics: France, Italy, Poland, the Far East, Germany, and post-war Europe. Anglo-American relations, in striking contrast to the previous debate, attracted almost no attention. One

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speaker dwelt at length upon the story of American businessmen stealing a march upon the British in Paris, 4/ but that speaker was Captain Cunningham-Reid, an Independent, who is not well regarded by most of his fellow members.

The French question attracted some attention, but much less attention than in the previous debate. What was said about it had to do with the perennial issue of recognition of the French provisional government. Churchill's observations on the subject had left many members in some doubt about his meaning, and Mr. Eden in closing the debate undertook to clarify the government's position, but not with complete success. The old friends of France, like Harold Nicolson, spoke warmly in support of recognition, and were supported from all sides of the House, though clearly the matter was regarded as of much less significance than it had been in the days before the liberation of France.

On Italy, it is a little difficult to appraise prevalent sentiment. When Mr. Churchill, in his opening speech, praised Badoglio and Prince Umberto, he was greeted by what he himself described as "a mocking giggle." 5/ But subsequent speakers on the subject were generally disposed to take the attitude that Italy had been allowed

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"to work her passage home" too quickly. Mr. Burgin, Conservative, remarked: "There is undoubtedly a feeling that military government was not maintained long enough after the liberation of part of Italy." 6/ Mr. Bartlett, Liberal, took very much the same line: "It is not so long ago," he observed, "that things were said in this House about the Italians which would make it almost as logical to say, because we now say that the Italians were not responsible for Mussolini, that the German people were not responsible for Hitler." 7/ Mr. Loverseed, Common Wealth, a veteran from the Republican side of the Spanish Civil War, was even more fearful of the Italian precedent when faced with the problem of a defeated Germany. "I can very well imagine," he said, "notable criminals in Germany, when their own necks are threatened, turning around and showing great ardor for the Allied cause." 8/ More than one speaker called for a reiteration of Mr. Eden's previous statement that Italy's colonies would not be restored to her, and Eden gave it from his seat. 9/ It is noteworthy that no single speaker supported wholeheartedly a generous policy towards Italy.

The Polish government aroused more vigorous controversy than any other issue. The Conservatives, generally speaking, supported the Polish Government-in-

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Exile and condemned the Russians; the Labor members, always excepting John McGovern of ILP, supported Russia. But the more judicious speakers followed Churchill's lead. In that vein, Quintin Hogg made what one shrewd critic regarded as the best speech in the debate. Harold Nicolson effectively expressed the characteristic attitude towards Russian susceptibility: "The merest sigh of perplexity which goes up from here echoes in their ears as a hurricane of abuse." His appeal to Russia was eloquent: "... the tone of this debate should convey to Russia an appeal from every bench in this House that Russia should act with that grandeur in the matter of Poland which she has shown in the field and elsewhere." 10/ But Nicolson's moderation was not the prevalent note, which was more positive, more critical, more in the nature of a demand than of an appeal. Indeed, one of the most outspoken of Russia's critics, Sir A. Southby, Conservative, went so far as to assert the right of the Baltic States to independence. 11/ With the exception of Mr. Callacher, the lone Communist member, only one voice was raised in defense of Russia (Mr. Cocks, Labor), and even he admitted that there had been faults and mistakes on both sides. 12/ Indeed, one of the most significant features in the debate, as compared with the debate in May, was the

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strong undertone of antagonism to Russia.

What Mr. Churchill had to say about the Far East attracted very little positive attention and no adverse criticism. One Conservative member, Sir Edward Campbell, emphasized the importance of reestablishing British prestige in the Far East, and insisted that both the British and the Dutch should have their "rightful share" in the defeat of Japan. "Unless," he said, "there are British forces capable and ready to hand to beat the Japanese, our prestige, our future, our friendship with the natives, our promises to the natives,- who naturally feel, as all of us would, that they have been let down,- will be imperiled." 13/

A great deal of attention was paid in the debate to the future of Germany. No less than seventeen speakers dealt with the subject, and they represented collectively almost every shade of party opinion. The sentiments expressed did not reveal any wide differences of opinion and they inclined towards moderation. Even Sir John Wardlaw-Milne, the chairman of a parliamentary committee of Conservatives which has steadily advocated the harshest terms for Germany, contented himself with saying that "the strongest course" would have to be followed in Germany after the war. He did not descend to particulars. 14/

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No one advocated partition, and at least two speakers denounced the so-called Morgenthau plan. 15/ No one advocated de-industrialization. No one supported, and more than one speaker opposed, the stripping away of German territory. There was general agreement that Germany should be completely disarmed and that war criminals should be punished. There was, with the single exception of John McGovern, general agreement that military occupation should follow defeat, but not much in the way of punitive measures was proposed. Many of those who spoke of punishment agreed that in the long run the Germans would have to be allowed to work their passage home. Commander King-Hall, a well-known champion of conciliatory measures, suggested that the control of Germany by an international commission should serve as a preliminary to the development of a European federation to which Germany should be a party. 16/ In general, it was felt that what mattered was not so much whether Germany was treated harshly or generously as that there should be agreement among the Allies and a common determination to enforce their terms. By and large the Labor members took a more generous attitude towards Germany than the Conservatives, but Vansittartism was conspicuous by its absence. There were at least three

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expressions of dissatisfaction with insistence upon unconditional surrender. Mr. Nicolson favored unconditional surrender in principle but objected to the phrase. "The dreadful thing about the phrase," he said, "is that it suggests that we are seeking to get political ends by military means, whereas if we had said 'complete military victory' it would have shown that we were trying to get military ends by military means, and the effect on opinion in Germany would have been much less confusing." 17/

There were two speakers, both of them Conservatives, who offered short and easy solutions of the German problem. Captain Plugge thought that all the difficulties could be overcome if Germany were to grant exclusive concessions for the control of all her transportation and communications for one hundred years to the United Nations, who would proceed to operate them through private companies. Lady Apsley suggested "that some part of the military armistice will be control of German scientific development after the war, and I believe that that can be done by closing German technical and scientific colleges and schools, leaving to Germany only the study of the higher humanities such as Architecture and other peaceful pursuits." She went on to suggest that German scientists should be taken

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out of Germany and distributed through the universities of the United Nations. It is indicative of the sobriety of the debate that this last suggestion provoked no comment.

Mr. Churchill, in his introductory speech, deprecated any discussion of international organization, and the members in the main respected his wishes. "That little was said revealed most clearly the rift between the Right and the Left. In general, the staunch Conservatives who discussed the matter urged caution in making commitments. One of their number, Commander Sir A. Southby, was even more outspoken. "Let us," he said, "set our faces against any return to that sloppy-minded internationalism which is a dangerous substitute for a just and honorable British foreign policy, based on principle. The British Empire is neither for sale nor will its people consent to any portion of it, however small, being run under any form of international trusteeship." 18/ Liberal and Labor sentiment, on the other hand, strongly favored the establishment of an international organization without delay. Mr. Hynd, Labor, declared it to be the only hope of international peace in the future. 19/ Sir Percy Harris, Liberal, one of the least contentious members of the House, ventured to disagree with the Prime Minister's cautious attitude and advocated a full and frank consideration of the machinery for international

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peace. 20/ Mr. Aneurin Bevan, Labor, one of the most contentious members of the House, took the same position in less deferential terms. 21/ It is probably safe to assume that the cleavage between Right-Wing Conservative opposition to an international authority and Labor's support of it still persisted in the House, though the expression of it was for the most part very restrained in response to the Prime Minister's request.

On the other hand, sentiment in favor of a European federation was definitely indicated by Cocks and Driberg for Labor, by Captain Thorneycroft for the Left-Wing Conservatives, and by Commander King-Hall for the Independents. 22/ And there was once again strong support from both sides of the House for the establishment of a close federation of Western Europe under British leadership. The Right-Wing Conservatives were most outspoken in support of such a policy, and it is clear enough that they were thinking in terms of power politics as opposed to collective security. 23/ Labor, on the other hand, justified its support on the grounds that the proposed federation should not be regarded as an alternative to an international authority but as supplementary to it. This view of the matter was expressed at length by Ivor Thomas. He pointed out that the United States had taken

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- 11 -

the lead in the Western Hemisphere, that the USSR clearly intended to take the lead in Eastern Europe, and that China would almost certainly take the lead in Asia when the Japanese had been overthrown. That Mr. Thomas envisaged was regional organizations within the general framework of an international authority. He did not indicate precisely what he meant by Western Europe. At times he seemed to be arguing for the unity of all Europe under British leadership. Specifically he mentioned Portugal, Holland, Denmark, Belgium, and Norway. It is to be presumed that he included France. He said nothing about Spain and Italy, and he left Germany suspended in air between Eastern and Western Europe. The nature of the federation he suggested was not integral union, but common policy among the members of the federation on matters of (1) foreign policy, (2) defense, (3) major economic considerations. Among the secondary arguments which he advanced in support of his programme he enumerated (1) that after Japan's defeat the members of the proposed federation would be practically the only colonial powers in the world, (2) that all the members would have a common seaboard, (3) that the English had a close racial affinity with the Dutch, the Danes, and the Norwegians. He went so far as to say that there was

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- 12 -

much less difference between a Norwegian and an Englishman than between an Englishman and a Scotchman or a Welshman. 24/

Mr. Aneurin Bevan was more outspoken and more concrete. He referred frankly to the necessity of building up British power to an equality with the USSR and the USA. "I would therefore suggest," he said, "it is in Great Britain's primary interest ... to see to it that at the earliest possible moment we base ourselves on taking the leadership of France, of Holland, of Belgium, of Norway, of Sweden and Italy, and I hope of Spain and Portugal. 25/ While neither Thomas nor Bevan can be regarded as representative figures in the Labor party, their endorsement of the idea of a Western European federation under British leadership is significant. The Labor party has heretofore been reluctant to approve of a Western European federation on the grounds that it represented a return to power politics. Thomas' conception of it within the framework of an international authority suggests a way in which Labor might identify itself with a course of action which has wide popular support.

Mr. Eden summed up the debate, dealing more at length with what appears to have been its main currents,

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- 13 -

i.e., (a) hostility towards Russia's treatment of Poland, (b) moderation towards Germany, (c) strong support of a western federation. 26/

On the Polish question, he said no more than that the government was deeply interested in Poland and that they hoped to find a solution of it. He emphasized the importance of not allowing it to create a rift between England and Russia. On the German question, he evidently felt that the House had gone somewhat too far in the direction of moderation, and he was at pains to point out that plans were already afoot in Germany to maintain organized Nazi resistance even during Allied occupation as the first step in preparation for another way. "So," he added, "I say that the occupation of Germany, and not only the occupation but the taking of every precaution that can be devised to prevent the recurrence of these affairs, becomes the insistent and most important responsibility of each one of the Allied governments. ... The principal danger to Europe -- this may not be agreed to by all, but this is my conviction -- after the defeat of Germany will be the re-emergence of a militant Germany. You may disagree about how you wish to avoid it, but that is the problem which will be a continuing one for the foreign policy not only of ourselves

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but of all those who come after us." Finally, Mr. Eden referred with approval to the explicit need for closer collaboration with Western Europe. "I agree with everything that has been said on that subject, and I think we can be sure that the friendships which have been made by the representatives of these countries while they have been here in the war years will be found to be of great value when they return to their own land. We have had certain informal discussions about our future relations and these will be pursued further in due course. ... On the other hand, I think we would be wise to use these conversations, and our close friendship with these countries, as a buttress to strengthen the general world structure. We should, I think, be wrong if we thought that in any such arrangement alone we should find peace or security for ourselves. It is an element in the general international system and ... it will give us more authority with the other great powers if we speak for the Commonwealth and for our near neighbours in Western Europe. That seems to me the right conception of the structure that we should try to build, and that is just the task on which we are now, in point of fact, engaged."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTES

- 1/ Churchill's speech is printed in full in The New York Times, 29 September 1944.
- 2/ Tribune (London), 7 October 1944.
- 3/ Alastair Forbes in The Daily Mail (London), cited in Time and Tide (London), 7 October 1944, p. 873.
- 4/ Hansard, Commons, 29 September 1944, c. 669.
- 5/ Hansard, Commons, 28 September 1944, c. 492.
- 6/ Ibid., c. 515.
- 7/ Ibid., c. 563.
- 8/ Hansard, Commons, 29 September 1944, c. 650.
- 9/ Hansard, Commons, 28 September 1944, cc. 507, 560.
- 10/ Hansard, Commons, 29 September 1944, cc. 682-3.
- 11/ Hansard, Commons, 28 September 1944, c. 557.
- 12/ Ibid., c. 588.
- 13/ Ibid., c. 567.
- 14/ Ibid., c. 545.
- 15/ Thorneycroft, Conservative, and McGovern, ILP.

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- 2 -

- 16/ Hansard, Commons, 28 September 1944, c. 572.
- 17/ Hansard, Commons, 29 September 1944, c. 684.
- 18/ Hansard, Commons, 28 September 1944, c. 561.
- 19/ Ibid., c. 581.
- 20/ Hansard, Commons, 29 September 1944, c. 621.
- 21/ Ibid., c. 627.
- 22/ Hansard, Commons, 28 September 1944, cc. 568, 587, 604; 29 September 1944, c. 636.
- 23/ Dunglass (c. 517), Grigg (c. 608), Headlam (c. 654), Pethick-Lawrence (c. 686).
- 24/ Hansard, Commons, 28 September 1944, cc. 537ff.
- 25/ Hansard, Commons, 29 September 1944, c. 635.
- 26/ Ibid., cc. 694ff.

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By Authority of CIA

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

O.S.S. from 5-44

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file

007622

24 November 1944

By WBS Date MAR 8 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I think you may be interested in several observations on conditions in southern France which we have received from two officers recently returned from an assignment in the Department of Ariege.

In the liberation of southwestern France, much of the fighting was carried on by the Spanish maquis. There are approximately 10,000 Spanish Loyalist refugees in that area, about half of them well armed and experienced guerrilla fighters. Of the small force which completed the liberation of Ariege, more than two-thirds were Spanish.

The best informed leaders of the Spanish maquis believe that anti-Franco feeling is rising in Spain and the government will probably fall of its own weight. Sources within Spain are said to have reported to these leaders that some 80 per cent of the Spanish Army is prepared to support guerrilla operations against Franco.

Although the Spanish maquis in Ariege disclaim communism and Russian leadership, they are on friendly terms with French

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- 2 -

communist leaders. In a Spanish newspaper published in France, one FFI leader promised all possible aid to the Spanish maquis in the liberation of their country, even to march with them on Madrid if necessary.

The FFI in Ariège and Toulouse is largely controlled by officers who are not so much communist by belief as they are adventurers or opportunists disguising their activities under that name. Since the liberation, the ranks of the FFI in that area have been swollen by large numbers of irresponsible youths who roam the countryside more eager to exercise command than to account to established authority.

Frenchmen given to sober reflection have been deeply disturbed by this unstable situation, and they fervently hope to see American forces sent into the area in considerable numbers. Although De Gaulle is respected by the general population, serious doubts were expressed whether his leadership would prove strong enough to avert chaos in southern France.

The disorders of the liberation appear to have had a lingering effect on the administration of justice. While in Ariège, the OSS officers discovered that seven collaborationists were to be shot without trial by a properly constituted authority. These officers, together with a British officer,

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
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- 3 -

filed an immediate protest with the chief of the FFI in Foix and with the French military representative of the De Gaulle Committee for southern France. This protest brought about a delay of several days, during which time a committee or court-martial was arranged, composed of men who had done little to resist the Germans but had used every means of winning control after the Germans had been expelled. Its deliberations were brief and immediately afterward the executions were carried out.

In the prison camps, however, conditions were on the whole good. This was confirmed in conversations with German officers in a camp occupied by prisoners guilty of systematic devastation of a nearby town.



William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

28 November 1944

Miss Grace Tully
White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the President will be interested in
seeing the attached memorandum.

Will you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of CIA

007622

By DBL Date MAR 8 1974

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PSF 068 folder 5-44

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~RESTRICTED~~

25 November 1944

file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I believe you will be interested in the enclosed radiotelephone message from our representative in Berne. This report deals with (1) efforts to arouse the German people to complete resistance; (2) difficulties which the Germans have experienced in connection with the Volkssturm; and (3) anticipation of almost total chaos after the collapse of Germany.

Donovan
William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

24 November 1944

DATE

FROM

Berno (via radiotelephone)

Nov 25 9 33 AM '44

#243

TO

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)
W. A. Kimbol

(FOR INFORMATION)
Director, Secretariat, Magruder,
Bigelow, Shopardson, Langer, Mayer,
Langsam, Onthank, Cheek

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

RECEIVED IN PLAIN TEXT

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GERMANY

1. According to reports from Berlin, the latest German slogan in the effort to rouse the German people to the last ounce of resistance is "Sieg oder Siberien", or, in translation, "Victory or Siberia". A Berlin paper, in proposing this slogan, remarks that these are the only alternatives before the German people. In this connection, a good deal of attention is being paid to the contemplated trip of General de Gaulle to Moscow as evidence of the fact that Russia is now determining the fate of France.

2. One of the most recent difficulties which the Germans apparently have experienced in connection with the Volksturm has arisen as a result of the theft of the antiquated arms which are being used in connection with the training of the Volksturm. Of course, the members of the Volksturm are allowed to retain the scanty arms which are given them for their training only during the actual training period. Then the arms are collected and put in depots. While these depots are supposed to be closely guarded, we have reports of two instances where entire depots have been taken away by unknown parties -- presumably by groups of persons who desire to have the wherewithal to protect themselves when the crash in Germany comes.

3. In considering the German picture as it will be after the German collapse, I believe we must anticipate the possibility of almost total chaos until order is established by the troops of occupation. When the Nazi Party machine collapses, when the SS run to cover, there will be no authority in Germany, and no one in a position to assume such authority. This applies not only to any central government -- it applies equally to the administration of the smallest hamlet in Germany. There will be a complete social, economic, administrative, and moral bankruptcy. The present shaky communication system will probably collapse, money will probably lose its value, and the people will return to a system of barter. The few persons in Germany who might have assumed some degree of leadership have now been liquidated or interned. There are no party organizations, unless the Communists have an underground, about which little if anything is known.

The Germans are a people accustomed to follow orders, but this requires that there be some one to give orders, and such people will be lacking. The returning defeated troops, plus the ten million-odd prisoners and workers, and the many millions of bombed-out and displaced persons will

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PAGE 2

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

Bernie

FROM

TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES 243

RECEIVED

likely form into marauding bands who will strip the country bare. Famine will probably be the fate of the larger German cities. In fact, it is likely that something approaching anarchy will prevail, except where that anarchy is mastered by our forces of occupation.

The above is a black picture, it may be somewhat overdrawn, but I fear not. It means that in Germany the occupying forces and the agencies working with the occupying forces will have to begin to build from the ground up, under conditions certainly far more difficult than they have had to experience in any other liberated country. Any plans which Allied agencies may have for operating in Germany during these early days should discount conditions somewhat as I described them above. These conditions will be aggravated if the collapse of Germany comes, as seems likely, in the middle of the winter, when conditions of life are the most difficult. Hunger and cold, plus defeat and desperation, will not make the German problem easy to handle.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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
25 November 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

The President will probably find
interesting the enclosed radiotelephone message
from our representative in Berne. I will appre-
ciate your seeing that it reaches his desk.

Sincerely yours,



William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

PSF: O.S.S. from 5-46

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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25 November 1944

file →

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The enclosed radiotelephone message, from our Berne representative, will probably be of interest to you. This message reports on the serious and probably fateful crisis which Germany is presently experiencing.

Donovan
William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 23 November 1944

#242

FROM Berne

HBO

PRIORITY

TO

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

RECEIVED IN PLAIN TEXT

SPD 15-40000-1

GERMANY

In judging the German situation from this near-by vantage point, it is sometimes difficult not to be over-influenced by what has proved to be temporary military successes on our part, or by momentary but possibly passing military, economic or internal crises in Germany. However, with all due allowance, there is an accumulation of evidence indicating that Germany is now going through a particularly serious and what may prove to be a fateful crisis. They may be able to stand on the Rhine, and in the South and East, for a little time longer, but the next week may well prove decisive, unless weather conditions are so impossible as to stop the offensives which are rapidly closing in on Germany, or to prevent the bombardments which are wrecking industry and transportation.

As to the Western Front, the events of the last few days have been particularly alarming for Germany. The fact that we have reached the Rhine in Alsace would have an effect, insofar as anything can have effect, on the benumbed German people. The reaction of Berlin to the battles near Aachen are sombre. Despite the recently reinforced censorship over all dispatches of foreign correspondents in Germany, the Berlin correspondent of La Suisse was able to report today that the battle of Aachen is alarming Berlin, and that the operation of General Patton's army, if it succeeded, would be very important for the months to come, because it would mean the total occupation of the Ruhr, and that, in consequence, Berlin was considering the present battle, not only as a defensive battle for the Siegfried Line, but for the region of the Rhine and the Ruhr, and for the entire Reich. These are significant words to hear from Germany.

While few Germans are allowed to travel abroad these days, what we hear from those who do come indicates a complete realization that it is only a question of time -- and possibly little time -- before the end. Prominent Germans coming here express themselves as completely hopeless, and by that they do not mean hopeless of victory, but hopeless that anything can be done in Germany which will prevent a complete chaos when the collapse comes. Many of them realize that the only constructive move that Germany could take today would be to open the Western Front and let the American and British armies make as quick as possible an occupation of

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PAGE 2

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

FROM Berns

TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

REF. NO. 242

RECEIVED~~RESTRICTED~~

Western Germany. But they fear that the German generals are too closely guarded by the SS to take any such action, even if the generals themselves should be disposed to do it.

All reports indicate that the transportation conditions in Germany are becoming chaotic. For the first time during the war, food distribution in the larger German cities appears to be seriously affected, creating dangers behind the front, because hungry people are less likely to fear the danger of the Gestapo machine-guns.

On top of all this, there is the mystery about Hitler. Persons coming from Berlin, who should be in a position to know, have no more information than we as to Hitler's whereabouts or state of health, or the extent of control he is exercising over affairs. It is not inconceivable that he may be deliberately allowing speculation to rise with a view to making a dramatic public appearance at some crucial moment. This, however, seems unlikely, as no moment could be much more crucial than the present, and his disappearance from the scene has had a weakening effect on German morale, such as it is. There are still many people in Germany who believe that Hitler is a miracle man, and are bolstered up by the idea that he may yet produce some gigantic counter-measure at a given moment. But faced with months of silence, this hope is waning, and if Hitler is playing a waiting game, the time during which he can wait is fast running out. The evidence seems to indicate that he is ill and has been ill since shortly after the July 20 attack. There is some documentary evidence to indicate that he was, at least, giving orders up to about a month ago, but nothing has been heard from him since. Of course, the fact that a particular action is taken at the direction of the Fuehrer does not have much significance, as Himmler, Goebbels, and the military authorities would make use of his name in any case.

On November 10, however, the Voelkischer Beobachter published an article which is considered by many as an attempt to prepare the German people for Hitler's disappearance as leader of the Third Reich. The article, entitled "The Man of Genius", is very curiously phrased and contains the following passage:

"At the high points of world history, there transpires a thing which an attentive person can also observe in every-day life. The personal side of a man of genius with all its inhibitions, doubts, and weaknesses is entirely distinct from his real, higher self as seen in his creative moments, and as evidenced by the things he creates. In the end, it is not always possible with a man of genius to fulfill entirely the sphere of activity which he himself has created. It often happens that the great work of a man of genius continues to develop by its own force and according to its own laws, while its creator declines and degenerates. In other words, the work of a man of genius becomes independent of his personality. World history shows that many rulers of genius, with their mortal personality laid bare to us pitilessly, but quite independent of that there remains

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PAGE 3

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

FROM Berne

TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

REF. NO. 242RECEIVED~~RESTRICTED~~

the real world-influencing Self, which, in the years when he was packed with creative power, built the foundations of a new life."

The German of this quotation almost defies translation in its mystic vagueness. At first it reads like an epitaph extolling the work of a deceased leader, but, if one re-reads it, it sounds more like an analysis of a weak and declining mortal who is still alive, but whose work has out-grown him, and who can be quickly forgotten, even though his creation lives on under the direction of new leaders.

Among the other evidences of the rapidly disintegrating situation in Germany, we have reports that the carry Japanese are trying to leave the sinking ship. Apparently considerable numbers of Japanese officials from Berlin are being attached to the same legation, and even larger numbers of Japanese civilians are applying for visas to come to Switzerland from Germany.

The above may be only straws in the wind, but the wind is now blowing on Germany as it has never blown before.

~~RESTRICTED~~

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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25 November 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President would be interested in the enclosed radiotelephone message from our representative in Berne. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

PSF: O.S.S. folder 5-55

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

28 November 1944


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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in Berne has transmitted the following intelligence, by radiotelephone, dated 27 November:

"Reports reaching us here make the impression that the local Communist Party in France has been overplaying its hand, and that its popularity is on the wane. After the trials of the last four years, most of the French people do not wish to be continually stirred up by agitators, and they are said to resent recent Communist tactics. It is possible, also, that the French Communists in their attacks on the United States and American policy have overplayed their hand. A person who was recently in the southwest of France claims to have seen leaflets of Communist origin to the general effect that now, that the Germans have been driven out, the next task before the French people was to drive out the Americans. This propaganda, according to my informant, outraged most of the French in the region where they are said to have been spread."


William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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28 November 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President would be interested in the enclosed radiotelephone report from our representative in Berne. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

PSF: OSS folder 57-44

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

29 November 1944

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
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information has been transmitted, by radiotelephone, by the OSS representative in Berne:

"The Swiss press is giving a good deal of attention to the tragic state of affairs in North Italy, and, in particular, to the problem of the Italian Partisans in the Alps, who are waging a rather desperate battle now rather more against the elements of nature than even against the Germans and the Fascists. The Germans have cleaned up the lower valley leading to many of the mountain retreats of the Partisans and have forced them into areas where food is scarce and the cold and weather conditions make life bitter. Unfortunately, the Italian Partisans now feel that they have been rather neglected by the Allies, and are becoming more and more desperate, not knowing whether the Allies consider that their activities are of sufficient value to justify the military effort involved in trying to arm, provision, and clothe them for the long winter which is ahead. Undoubtedly, the situation in all of North Italy is becoming more and more acute. The fact that France has been freed, while the hopes of the people in North Italy for liberation have been disappointed, tends to embitter and discourage the population. The danger of Communism in the industrial areas of North Italy is a real one. Or, if not Communism, at least a kind of anarchy in areas not immediately controlled by the German

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forces. While this will not make it easy for the Germans, it will render our problem doubly difficult upon the liberation of North Italy. It would seem that we had an interest in doing what we can to keep the Italian Resistance alive, not only from the point of view of the possible military assistance in cutting the German lines of communications, but also from the viewpoint of the maintenance of peace and order upon the liberation of North Italy."


William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

29 November 1944

~~RESTRICTED~~

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President would find interesting the enclosed radiotelephone message from our Berne representative. Will you be good enough to see that it reaches him? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

PST: 0.1.1. fucaw 5-44

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

29 November 1944

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file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following intelligence has been received from the OSS representative in Berne, by radiotelephone:

"There has not been a time in the last few years when there was as little news as is coming out of Germany now. Before the liberation of France, much about Germany came via Paris, and a good deal of news seeped out of Alsace. Now these doors are closed. Fewer and fewer Germans are being allowed to leave the country, and some of those who might normally come do not wish to risk the dangers and hardships of a railway trip under present traveling conditions in Germany. The chief railways leading into Switzerland from Germany via Basel are now within range of our gunfire. The foreign press correspondents in Germany have been placed under new restrictions, and the German press is generally colorless and uninteresting.

"In the 27 November edition of the Bund, for example, which has two and one-half pages of foreign news and commentary, an ultimatum from Germany for German-occupied territory is in a short military communique via DNB."

Donovan

William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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
29 November 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I think the President would be interested in the enclosed radiotelephone report from the OSS representative in Berne. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,



William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

O.S.S. folder 3-84
file **SECRET**
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.


30 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached an account of a conversation had by an OSS source with anti-Nazi members of the Junker class which I think you will find of interest. This is one of the Black reports series. As I mentioned in an earlier memorandum dealing with the Black series, we are giving this material very careful handling in order to assure continuance of the reports.

I am also sending a copy of the within report to the Secretary of State. However, I am attaching to your copy alone, a paper disclosing facts about the Junkers with whom the talks were had.

Donovan
William J. Donovan
Director



SECRET

Special Black Report

PRESENT ATTITUDE OF GERMAN JUNKERS

Talks with anti-Nazi members of the Junker class whose names may not, for obvious reasons, be disclosed, allow us to sketch a state of mind which is now certainly widespread in Germany.

Junker circles violently reject the accusation that the wars of 1870-1914 were caused by the Germans. They say that not so much the economic and other material clauses of the Versailles treaty offended them, but the accusation in the treaty that they were culpable. They left the public refutations of this to demagogues and kept silent in the conviction that the general international situation and not German provocation was the cause of the war of 1914. They were sure of reestablishing German honor by peaceful means. When Hitler took over power they thought: the fool will crash in six weeks. When this did not happen, they then thought it was a matter of six months, or two years. They say the most dangerous support to Hitler was given by England refusing to act against him after Rhineland, Saar de-militarization, etc. They say the aims of the greater German Reich (including Austria and Sudetenland)

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are those of the great majority of Germans; also of the Austrians and Sudetenlanders. They say Alsace is not really German, and desire it remain with France, for the Alsatians always have insisted that German unity is strong in the people and that the people would rebel against division. They admit the opposition between Bavaria and Prussia, Baden and Wurtemberg, etc., but say that it is only natural for brothers to quarrel as long as they are together, but unite when anyone dares try to divide the house. Our spokesmen absolutely denied that the German people feel themselves superior to others and claim this is a Nazi propaganda theme. They say the youth is not indoctrinated by Nazism and that this can be explained by the fact that the youth is naturally against those who are in authority. They claim that the Lutheran Junkers have now close relations with the Catholics in common resistance, and that the Lutherans often go to Catholic mass and vice versa. One theme of conversation seems to be common in these circles: it is not dogma that matters, but the common norms of a decent and happy life. They stress that the sufferings of the German people are unimaginable and that the terror wielded by the Gestapo is even worse than can be described.

They insist that their class, and the majority of

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- 3 -

the German people, has a "socialist faith" which is the belief that all men can be given what is necessary for a decent life through planned economy. As the Nazis have already expropriated, or control most of the property, liberalistic capitalism is already a thing of the past. They fear Communist brutalities more than anything else and a longing for the other side, for France, when they are incorporated into Germany; for Germany, when they are part of France. Our spokesmen say that German-speaking Swiss, Luxemburgers, are not to be considered as Germans either.

These Junker groups claim they have made three efforts to oust Hitler, the last of which was the attempt on Hitler's life made by von Stauffenberg. They say that their plans for a German "Commonwealth" have been worked out. This would not be on the basis of a federation, and would not include the reestablishment of the King of Bavaria and other Princes. It would include the general establishment of popular rule by elections, first of village, then county authorities, finally of regional governments. The eight units of the Commonwealth as planned are:

Prussia (including Brandenburg, East Prussia,
Silesia)

~~SECRET~~

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- 4 -

Hanover (including Hamburg, Kiel, Schlesing
Holstein)

Saxony (including the Sudeten)

Baden-Wurtemberg, Westfalia, Rhineland, Bavaria
and Austria

They suggest that two years after the war, a plebescite should decide if Austria is to join the German Commonwealth. They insist that the German democracy would not be parliamentary, but authoritarian, as the Germans are servile, like to obey, and want a Fuehrer. They say they would collaborate with Anglo-Saxons if these occupy the whole of Germany with an international control.

CONFIDENTIAL:

Much stress was laid in this talk on the point of international control of Germany. The Junker Spokesman said that if the Allies carried through the plan of having one part of Germany occupied by the Bolsheviki and the other parts by English and Americans, then the Anglo-Saxons would find refusal to collaborate also in the parts occupied by them. The reason for this, he said, is that the Germans act as one people and will not admit that Prussia be subjected to the Bolsheviki. He strongly advocated a joint Allied Committee for the control of the whole of Germany. He gave me the

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- 5 -

impression that there are official talks of Junker groups in this direction, and that he desires to enlist public opinion agencies in this direction.

* * * * *

November 30, 1944.

COMMENT

These talks confirm that even in the face of catastrophies, the German Junker class has not acquired the necessary attitude to be a peaceful element. The first conditions: to admit faults and give up exaggerated pride, have not been fulfilled.

It is also clear that pan-Germanism, the claim that biological similarities must make the basis of a state, is also not abandoned. The nationalistic aims, if not uprooted, are sure to stir up new wars. Even in this period of defeat, there are still threats of what will happen if the Allies do not fulfill German-made plans.

It becomes evident that the Germans must feel that

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the Allies are firmly determined to divide Germany, as a nation, into parts, so that ancient, non-nationalistic and non-militaristic tradition can be revived. As Germans are admittedly servile, they must feel the international authority is a decided master and that neither pan-Germanism nor Germany itself can ever be re-established. On condition that there is no German "bloc" in the center of Europe, German individuals can rest assured that the Allies will favor for them also decent living conditions and the opportunity to obtain personal happiness. They must learn, however, that they can never find true happiness under a strong German master. It must be admitted that the German people have not desired the brutal means Hitler and the Gestapo use, but it cannot be overlooked that they have forgiven the means, in their desire for nationalistic aim, and had nationalistic pride as an ersatz for happiness. It is the German goal for unity, producing a strength which inevitably brings aggression, which must be uprooted.

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November 30, 1944

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SOURCE OF SPECIAL BLACK REPORT

The source of the above is Herr von Kessel, "conseiller d'ambassade" of the Germany Embassy at the Holy See. He is a Prussian Junker, Lutheran, whose family lives in Silesia, near Prussia. He is evidently the energetic leader of the Embassy group: Von Braun, secretary of the Embassy (also Prussian Junker, Lutheran) is younger and his subordinate, and von Weiszacker, the Ambassador, seems to be a calm and nice gentleman, but not really a driving power. Von Kessel is a career diplomat, speaking French and English perfectly, and extremely intelligent and dynamic. He used to go regularly to Germany: his last mission was last Christmas. I won his confidence by stating our problem clearly: no peace can be built on destruction alone but Germany must have concrete hopes of a possible way to become a peaceful member of the family of nations. We want to stress this central idea in public opinion and now it is the central idea of the Pope, but the plan to organize the guarantee of a peaceful Germany must come from inside Germany. He then started outlining his ideas on which he has worked for a long time, and is elaborating in a book which is nearly finished. He has grave fears that if the least thing leaks out about

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his ideas, his family will immediately be slaughtered. At the end of the talk, it was clear that he is a member of a Junker organization which has, several times, tried to overthrow or kill Hitler. He confided that the plans (exposed above) for a German Commonwealth were worked out in detail and would have been submitted to the Allies as soon as Hitler was killed. Happily, the group was able to destroy the documents before Stauffenberg and other members of the group were caught, tortured and killed. Von Braun seems to belong to the same group, but it is not known yet if von Weiszacker does.

The preparations for this series of talks have been very intricate. Father Obolensky, man of confidence of Cardinal Tisserand, studied in Berlin after leaving Russia in 1925. (His father, Prince Obolensky, former diplomat, received a visa through foreign diplomatic interventions). He could thus gradually cultivate friendship of von Braun. He then said there was an international Catholic Agency working now mainly in America with which he had contact. Von Braun showed great interest and said he wanted more contacts with Catholics and began to speak of his anti-Nazi convictions. Obolensky said: "Why don't

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you come over to the Allies?" Von Braun answered: "What do they offer us: unconditional surrender. I cannot forsake my fatherland on those conditions".

In a following talk, Obolensky said that one of the founders of the International Catholic Agency was in Rome. Von Braun asked: "Could you arrange a meeting for me to see this gentleman?" Obolensky said: "I will try". In a following talk (before the audience with the Pope) von Braun asked: "I hope you will succeed in making an appointment with".....and gave exact name, status and name of agency. Thus he evidently has good contacts who knew of my visits to the Vatican which had been very quiet before the audience with the Pope. (It was after the first signed article in "Il Quotidiano" however, so that it is possible that he may have guessed, by reading this article, that the work was the same as the agency described in general terms by Obolensky.)

The appointment was made for Sunday, at twelve in the morning, as there were no employees then. Arriving at Santo Martha House in the Vatican where foreign diplomats live, the police refused to let me in. Obolensky, who had a special paper was able to get through. (I did not want

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to ask for a special permit from the State Secretariate at this time). He made an appointment in St. Peter's and we went up to the dome where there were quiet spots where we could talk. Only von Kessel came; von Braun, coming later, could not be warned of the change in meeting place. Von Kessel is very desirous of having more talks and I have given him hope that I would find time next week. Obolensky saw von Braun yesterday and told him of our talk. The common impression of von Kessel and von Braun is that I raise sharp political questions and understand their answers, but that I am prejudiced because of my belief in the culpability of the German people, especially of the Junkers. Obolensky has the impression that von Weiszacker has followed this matter from the beginning. It is very clear to them that I am only a leader of W.O.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

30 November 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the attached memorandum
will be of interest to the President. Will
you please see that it reaches his desk?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

Attachment